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ABSTRACT
The rapid spread of COVID-19 has made traditional manual contact
tracing to identify potential persons in close physical proximity to
an known infected person challenging. Hence, a number of public
health authorities have experimented with automated contact trac-
ing apps. While the global deployment of contact tracing apps aims
to protect the health of citizens, these apps have raised security and
privacy concerns. In this paper, we assess the security and privacy
of 34 exemplar contact tracing apps using three methodologies:
(i) evaluate the design paradigms and the privacy protections pro-
vided; (ii) static analysis to discover potential vulnerabilities and
data flows to identify potential leaks of private data; and (iii) evalu-
ate the robustness of privacy protection approaches. Based on the
results, we propose a venue-access-based contact tracing solution,
VenueTrace, which preserves user privacy while enabling proximity
contact tracing. We hope that our systematic assessment results
and concrete recommendations can contribute to the development
and deployment of applications against COVID-19 and help gov-
ernments and application development industry build secure and
privacy-preserving contract tracing applications.
1 INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 is now a global pandemic affecting over 200 countries,
after its first recorded outbreak in China in December 2019. To
counter its spread, numerous measures have been undertaken by
public health authorities, e.g. quarantining of people, lock-downs,
curfews, physical distancing, and mandatory use of face masks.
Identifying those who have been in close contact with infected
individuals, followed by self-isolation (so called contact tracing) has
proven particularly effective [46]. Consequently, contact tracing
has emerged as a key tool to mitigate the spread. However, manual
contract tracing, using an army of “detectives” is not trivial and has
proven challenging for many countries, e.g. UK and Italy. Notably,
it is difficult due to the rapid and exponential growth patterns of
the virus and the increased demands on qualified human resources.
After 5 months of the pandemic, the number of daily new case has
increasedmore than 80 fold.1 Thus, in many countries it has become
extremely difficult to perform manual contact tracing [19, 24, 35].
Government authorities around the world, together with indus-
try, have sought to address the challenge by developing contact
tracing applications and services. A plethora of apps and services
11,354 confirmed per day in the first 30 days from 11 January to 10 February 2020 and
109,615 confirmed per day in the recent 30 days from 13 May to 12 June 2020—using
data released by the World Health Organization (WHO).
are currently deployed around the globe. These include the Health
Code in China [47], the public COVID-19 website in South Ko-
rea [14], and the mobile contact tracing apps released in Singa-
pore [31], Israel [43], and Australia [22, 23]. Contact tracing apps
operate by recording prolonged and close proximity interactions
between individuals by using proximity sensing methods, e.g. Blue-
tooth. The data gathered allows notifications to be generated to
inform persons of a potential exposure to the virus.
Proponents argue that the low cost and scalable nature of con-
tract tracing apps make them an attractive option for health author-
ities. Despite this, contact tracing apps are not universally popular,
with a number of prominent critics. They have proven particularly
controversial due to potential violations of privacy [36], and se-
curity consequences from the mass-scale installation of (rapidly
developed) apps across entire populations. Despite attempts to alle-
viate these concerns by both governments and industry, it is well
known that the anonymization of individual information is a chal-
lenging problem [21]. This study, to the best of our knowledge,
performs the first security and privacy vetting of contact tracing
apps. We describe our key contributions below:
• We assess the security and privacy of 34 worldwide Android
contact tracing applications, listed in Table 3. We discover
about 70% of the apps pose potential security risks due to:
(i) employing cryptographic algorithms that are insecure or
not part of best practice; and (ii) storing sensitive informa-
tion in clear text that could be potentially read by attack-
ers. Over 60% of apps pose vulnerabilities through Manifest
weaknesses, e.g. allowing permissions for backup (hence, the
copying of potentially unencrypted application data). Fur-
ther, we identify that approximately 75% of the apps contain
at least one tracker, potentially causing serious privacy leak-
age, i.e. data leaks that lead to exposing private information,
to third parties. To facilitate further research, we will pub-
licly release the dataset, the scripts developed for analysis,
and security assessment reports in due course.
• We analyze user privacy exposure and privacy protections
provided by 10 solutions—covering 3 different frameworks
(PACT [18], Covid Watch [52], and PEPP-PT [54]), the Coron-
avirus Disease-19 website [14], and 6 applications — from 7
countries around the world. We establish a threat model and
analyze the vulnerabilities of the apps to multiple privacy at-
tacks. The results demonstrate that there is no solution that
is able to protect users’ privacy against all of attacks inves-
tigated. Generally, Bluetooth-based decentralized solutions
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
10
93
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 J
un
 20
20
Ruoxi Sun, Wei Wang, Minhui Xue, Gareth Tyson, Seyit Camtepe, and Damith Ranasinghe
that avoid direct location tracking outperform centralized
systems.
• We synthesize the findings from our extensive COVID-19
contact tracing app vetting exercises to: (i) provide best prac-
tice security and privacy guidance to governments and app
industry; and (ii) recommend a novel decentralized venue-
accessing-based contact tracing approach, termed Venue-
Trace, to overcome potential privacy issues highlighted in
the state-of-the-practice solutions. Our VenueTrace proposal
has the capability to significantly increase the privacy pro-
tections for citizens whilst being securely implemented.
We have disclosed our findings and detailed security and privacy
risk reports to the related stakeholders on 23 May 2020, at 11 am,
UTC.We have received acknowledgements from numerous vendors,
such as MySejahtera (Malaysia), Pakistan’s National Action Plan for
COVID-19 (Pakistan), Contact Tracer (USA), and Private Kit (USA).
We believe our study can provide useful insights for governments,
developers and researchers in the software industry to develop
secure and privacy-preserving contact tracing apps. We hope the
results and the proposed contact tracing approach will contribute
to increasing the trustworthiness of solutions to contain infectious
diseases now and in the future.
2 CONTACT TRACING APPLICATIONS
A range of contract tracing applications (or “apps”) are used world-
wide. Given the large number of contact tracing apps and proposed
solution frameworks, we survey a representative sample to more
broadly study the architectures employed, design paradigms and
the privacy exposure of the user groups we identified in Section 2.1.
2.1 Users Groups and Privacy Exposure
We define model user groups and privacy exposure levels to aid
our our investigations into app architectures (in Section 2.2) and
privacy vetting (in Section 4). We envisage three groups of contact
tracing app users, based on their health status. We describe the
three users groups below and analyze their privacy exposure in
Section 2.2.
• Generic user. A typical user of the contact tracing system,
who is healthy or has not been diagnosed yet.
• At-risk user. Alice, who has recently been in contact with
an infected user, Bob. Ideally, Alice will receive an at-risk
alarm from her application.
• Diagnosed user. As a diagnosed patient, Bob will be asked
to reveal his private information as well as the information
of at-risk users to the health authorities, e.g. the diagnosis
of his infection, his movement history, the persons he has
been in contact with.
We define user group exposures in different apps using five
levels:
• Level I: “No data is shared with a server or users”, the most
secure level in which there is no user data shared.
• Level II: “Tokens are shared with proximity users”, a medium
exposure level with only tokens containing no Personal Iden-
tifiable Information (PII) exchanged between users.
• Level III: “Tokens are shared with the server”, a medium
exposure level with tokens exposed to the server.
• Level IV: “PII is shared with a server”, a high risk exposure
level in which the users’ PII is shared with the server.
• Level V: “PII is published to public”, the highest risk exposure
level.
2.2 Analysis of Design Paradigms and User
Privacy Exposure
We select 10 well known contact tracing solutions—including both
current apps and proposed frameworks. Table 1 presents an overview
of the 10 selected solutions. Four of the selected solutions are de-
velopments of apps used from the early stages of the pandemic
(supported by governments such as China, South Korea, Singapore,
and Israel). The one service and a proposed framework from Eu-
rope were selected because they are the first solutions that enable
anonymous identifier exchange. We have also selected three solu-
tions that are about to or have already been deployed from North
America and one app deployment from Oceania. As summarized in
Table 2, all 10 solutions have user privacy exposure to some extent.
We next discuss them in the context of the two broad categories
of: (i) centralized architectures; and (ii) decentralized/distributed
architectures.
Centralized solutions. Many solutions utilize a centralized sys-
tem in which the central server is responsible for: (i) collecting
the contact records from diagnosed users; and (ii) health status
evaluation for users and at-risk user determination. In some East
Asian countries, e.g. China and South Korea, where the outbreaks
first occurred, contact tracing systems were quickly developed and
released. The systems helped health authorities to successfully
control the spread of COVID-19, but a huge amount of Personal
Identifiable Information (PII) was collected.
In South Korea, the Coronavirus Disease-19 website [14] (#7 in Ta-
ble 1) is supported by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Although
Alice’s privacy is protected as no data is required from her, the sys-
tem publishes Bob’s information to the public (marked as Level V in
Table 2). The information exposed includes gender, nationality, age,
diagnosis date, hospital, and movement history (removed in the
latest version). This directly puts Bob at risk of being re-identified,
raising serious privacy concerns. For example, as reported by The
Washington Post [34], in Cheonan, a city in South Korea, a text
alert to residents showed that an infected person visited “Imperial
Foot Massage at 13:46 on 24 February”.
In China, QR-code contact tracing apps were developed by the
two Tech companies, Alibaba and Tencent [47] (#2). The apps use
a colour code to present the health condition of an individual–
green implies people can travel freely, while yellow or red indicates
they must report to the authorities. Users need to provide their
name, national ID, and phone number to register and use the app
to enter public places, e.g. the metro stations, supermarkets, and
airports. The apps are mandatory and jointly developed by govern-
ment departments and supported by data from health and transport
authorities. In this solution, for all types of users, their privacy in-
formation will be shared with the central server. Thus, we evaluate
the user exposure of Health Code as Level IV in Table 2. However,
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Table 1: Representative state-of-the-practice solutions from seven countries and five continents.
ID Country Name Developer Private/State Technique Architecture
1 Australia COVIDSafe Australian Department of Health State Bluetooth Centralized
2 China Health Code Alibaba Private QR code Centralized
3 Europe PEPP-PT∗ International consortium Private Bluetooth Centralized
4 Europe DP3T International consortium Private Bluetooth Decentralized
5 Israel HaMagen Ministry of Health State Location Decentralized
6 Singapore TraceTogether Government Technology Agency State Bluetooth Centralized
7 South Korea Coronavirus Disease-19 Ministry of Health and Welfare State Location Centralized
8 USA Covid Watch∗ Standford University Private Bluetooth Decentralized
9 USA Private Kit Massachusetts Institute of Technology Private GPS+Bluetooth Decentralized
10 USA PACT∗ University of Washington Private Bluetooth Decentralized
∗Note: frameworks with no application implemented
Table 2: User exposure.
Solutions Generic At-risk Diagnosed Architecture
COVIDSafe Centralized
Health Code Centralized
PEPP-PT Centralized
DP3T Decentralized
HaMagen Centralized
TraceTogether Centralized
Coronavirus Disease-19 Centralized
Covid Watch Decentralized
PACT Decentralized
Private Kit Decentralized
Level I : No data is shared with servers or users,
Level II : Token shared with proximity users, Level III : Token shared with the server,
Level IV : PII shared with the server, Level V : PII is published to public.
although such solutions may collect and expose more privacy infor-
mation than other solutions we discuss later, a public perceptions
survey [39] indicates that the users in USA prefer centralized sys-
tems that share diagnosed users’ recent locations in public venues.
TraceTogether [31] from Singapore is the first solution that uses
Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth-based solutions rely on proximity
tracing via Bluetooth broadcasts from apps. As these occur exclu-
sively between devices in proximity, these methods provide more
scope for privacy-preserving computations compared to those that
use GPS locations (Coronavirus Disease-19 and Hamagen [43]). In
TraceTogether, proximity between two users is measured through
the Bluetooth broadcast signals and encrypted user information is
stored on mobile devices. Once diagnosed, the user will be asked to
upload their local on-device records to the Ministry of Health with
the authority to decrypt the data and obtain the mobile numbers
of the user’s close contacts within a period of time (e.g. 21 days)
that covers the incubation period of the virus. Such a centralized
BLE-based solution preserves more personal privacy as the data
exchanged between users is not related to absolute location in-
formation. COVIDSafe [23] from Australia also utilizes a similar
technique. However, considering that the PII, e.g. phone numbers,
is collected by the government, the at-risk and diagnosed users’
PII is exposed to the central server (Level IV in Table 2), while the
exposure of generic users still remains in Level II as the tokens are
only shared between users.
The solutions that expose PII may not work well in countries
with different societal norms. Thus, many western countries devel-
oped solutions with no PII related information exchange, e.g. PEPP-
PT [54]. In PEPP-PT, an ephemeral user ID is implemented based
on a seed randomly generated by a user device. Users will exchange
ephemeral IDs, instead of encrypted PII messages, to record a prox-
imity contact event, thus reducing the privacy exposure of diag-
nosed users to Level III where tokens are shared with servers.
Decentralized solutions. The second type of solution is decentral-
ized, where: (i) the back-end server is only responsible for collecting
the identifiers that was used by diagnosed users, e.g. the broadcast
token, from diagnosed patients; and (ii) the health evaluation is
conducted on users’ devices, locally. This design prevents the cen-
tral server from knowing the infected person, and their physical
proximity contacts.
Some decentralized systems rely on location information. For
example, Hamagen (#5), an app provided by the Israeli Ministry of
Health, obtains but does not share location data from the user’s
phone and compares it with the information stored in a central
server regarding the location histories of confirmed cases. As no
data is shared before diagnosis, the exposure level of at-risk users
are evaluated as Level I in Table 2. However, the diagnosed users
will be notified and given the option of reporting their exposure
to the Health Ministry by filling out a form; subsequently, their
location trails are released to public.
Other Bluetooth solutions, e.g. DP3T [55] (#4), Covid Watch [52]
(#8), and PACT [18] (#10), implement decentralized designs to allow
users to download diagnosed anonymous identifiers from the back-
end server and compare with local records to obtain their risk of
exposure to the virus. The design paradigm reduces the exposure
level of at-risk users to Level II and the level of diagnosed users to
Level III in Table 2 as no PII is shared by users. Apple and Google
have released the “privacy-preserving contact tracing” API, which
can support building decentralized contact-tracing apps [2].
Another application, Private Kit [8] (#9), a decentralized solution
developed by Raskar et al. [49], enables individuals to log their own
location information. Particularly, Private Kit also allows Bluetooth
broadcasts between users to enable direct notification between
users. As the sharing of diagnosed users’ location trails and the
broadcasts between users is privacy protected, we determine Private
Kit’s user exposure levels to be the same as other Bluetooth-based
decentralized solutions.
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3 SECURITY VETTING
In this section, we consider the list of 34 contact tracing apps cu-
rated and summarised in Table 3. We downloaded the apps from
Google Play Store and evaluated their security performance against
the four vetting categories: (i) manifest weaknesses; (ii) general
vulnerabilities; (iii) data leaks (with a focus on those that violate
user privacy); and (iv) malware detection. We detail the list of issues
considered in Table 4.
3.1 Methodology
An overview of our security vetting methodology is shown in Fig-
ure 1 and we describe the method used for selecting the apps for
our investigation in Section 3.1.1. We perform: (i) static analysis,
including code analysis and data flow analysis; (ii) dynamic analysis
to detect malware.
3.1.1 Apps Selection. In order to curate a list of contact tracing
apps, we first searched the keywords, e.g. “contact tracing”, “Covid”,
“tracing coronavirus”, in Google Play Store. We also started with
known official apps from countries, e.g. the COVIDSafe recom-
mended by Australian government. After a contact tracing app is
found, we assess its functionality by reading the app descriptions
and select those with in excess of 10,000 downloads. Subsequently,
we include the app into the set and look for new apps through the
recommendation links in the app store, until there are no contact
tracing apps found. We repeated this procedure one week later and
finalised the list of 34 contact tracing apps summarised in Table 3
on 1 May 2020.
3.1.2 Static Analysis. We perform static analysis on the Android
Package (APK) binary files. We first de-compile the APK of each
app to its corresponding class and xml files. Then, we utilize the
Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) [6] to perform code analysis
and FlowDroid [15] for data flow analysis. Notably, we augment
our static analysis with manual inspections to further increase
the robustness of the vetting process. We detail our approach in
Appendix A.
3.1.3 Dynamic Analysis. We rely on malware scanners to flag mali-
cious artifacts in contact tracing apps. Concretely, we send the APKs
to VirusTotal [12], a free online service that integrates over 70
antivirus scanners, which has been widely adopted by the research
community [28, 41]. As shown in Table 4, the results of malware
detection will identify the detected viruses, worms, Trojans, and
other malicious content embedded in the apps.
3.2 Security Vetting Results
We next inspect the presence of security vulnerabilities among the
34 considered apps. Figure 2 shows the percentage of contact tracing
apps that have security weakness found in our Code Analysis.
Code analysis. Figure 2 shows that the most prominent vulnerabil-
ities extracted from the manifest weaknesses. We observed that 68%
of apps do not set the flag allowBackup to False. Consequently,
users with enabled USB debugging can copy application data from
the device. Other weaknesses detected are related to “Clear Text
Traffic” such as plaintext HTTP, FTP stacks, DownloadManager,
Table 3: Contact tracing apps considered in our analysis.
Applications∗ Country Downloads Version
Coronavirus AlgÃľrie Algeria 100K 1.0.3
Stopp Corona Austra 100K 1.1.4.11
CoronaReport Austra 10K 2.9.5
Coronavirus Australia Australia 500K 1.0.2
COVIDSafe Australia 1M 1.0.11
BeAware Bahrain Bahrain 100K 0.1.4
Coronavirus Bolivia Bolivia 50K 1.2.7
Coronavirus - SUS Brasil 1M 2.0.5
COVID-19! Czech 10K 0.9.4
Stop Covid Georgia 100K 1.0.461
COVA Punjab India 1M 1.2.2
CG Covid-19 ePass India 500K 1.0.6
West Bengal Emergency Fund India 10K 1.3
Hamagen Israel 1M 1.1.2
Stop COVID-19 KG Kyrgyzstan 10K 0.3.137.325
MySejahtera Malaysia 500K 1.0.8
SOS CORONA Mali 10K 0.0.6
Nepal COVID-19 Surveillance Nepal 5K 1.1.1
Hamro Swasthya Nepal 50K 1.3.2
COVID Radar Netherlands 50K 1.1.2
National Action Plan Pakistan 50K 1.1
Corona Map Saudi Arabia 50K 1.0.0
TraceTogether Singapore 500K 1.8.0
NICD COVID-19 Case Investigation South Africa 10K 1.16
STOP COVID19 CAT Spain 500K 1.0.2
StopTheSpread COVID-19 UK 100K 1.0.0
Coronavirus UY Uruguay 100K 2.2.3
Private Kit USA 10K 0.5.19
Contact Tracing USA 10K 1.3.8
Contact Tracer USA 10K 2.0.2
COVID-19 Vietnam 100K 1.0
NCOVI Vietnam 1M 1.5.3
Vietnam Health Declaration Vietnam 100K 1.0.12
Bluezone Vietnam 100K 1.0.1
∗Note: apps were collected on 24 April 2020 and 1 May 2020 from Google Play Store.
Table 4: Security vetting categories.
Vetting Category∗ Security Issues
Manifest Weaknesses
Insecure flag settings, e.g. app data backup allowed
Non-standard launch mode
Clear text traffic
Vulnerabilities
Sensitive data logged
SQL injection
IP address disclosure
Uses hard-coded encryption key
Uses improper encryption
Uses insecure SecureRandom
Uses insecure hash function
Remote WebView debugging enabled
Privacy Leaks TrackersPotential Leakage Paths from Sources to Sinks
Malware Detection Viruses, worms, Trojansand other kinds of malicious content
∗Note: security issues are summarized from FlowDroid (Privacy Leaks), VirusTotal
(Malware), andMobSF (Manifest Weaknesses, Privacy Leaks, & Vulnerabilities).
and MediaPlayer, which may enable a network attacker to im-
plement man-in-the-middle (MITM) [5] attacks during network
transmission.
Notably, during our manual review of the vetting results from
MobSF. We found false positives in three results, i.e. Clear Text
Storage, Saving Data in Temporary File, and SQL Injection. For
example, in the application COVIDSafe, broadcast and channel
identifiers, encryption algorithm names, and placeholders, which
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Figure 1: Overview of our security vetting methods. Importantly, we also augment the analysis with manual inspections.
are used to receive or query specific values but do not contain sen-
sitive information, are stored as constant values. However, MobSF
regards all constant string values as potential clear text storage.
Some applications, e.g. Coronavirus UY (Uruguay), create template
files while decompressing and loading multiple dex files in order
to avoid the 64K reference limit [42]. Other applications, e.g. CG
Covid-19 ePass (India), are able to scan other’s barcode and save it
into temporary files in order to read the content. However, these
behaviours are mis-regarded as temporary file leakage byMobSF.
All these false-positives were removed through manual inspections
from our further analysis.
Figure 2 shows that the most frequent weakness detected by
static analysis is the “Risky Cryptography Algorithm”. Over 90% of
apps use at least one of the deprecated cryptographic algorithms, e.g.
MD5 and SHA-1. For instance, in the app MySejahtera (Malaysia),
the parameters in WebSocket requests are combined and encrypted
with MD5 which will be compared with the content from requests
in the class Draft_76 in order to verify the validity of connections.
Although this has been listed in the top 10 OWASP [7] mobile
risks 2016, the results show that it is still a common security issue.
Another frequent weakness is “Clear Text Storage” (files may con-
tain hard-coded sensitive information like usernames, passwords,
keys etc.). In class DataBaseSQL of COVID-19 (Vietnam) app, the
password of SQLite database is stored in the source code without en-
cryption; CG Covid-19 ePass (India) also hard-coded its encryption
key in class Security.
In total, 20 trackers have also been identified, including Google
Firebase Analytics, Google CrashLytics, and Facebook Ana-
lytics. Approximately 75% of the apps contain at least one tracker.
As shown in Table 5, the most frequent tracker is Google Fire-
base Analytics which is identified in more than 70% of the apps.
Notably, a research study [37] argues that TraceTogether using
Google’s Firebase service to store user information may leak user’s
privacy to third parties, such as Google. In the most extreme case, a
contact tracing app, the Contact Tracing (USA), contains 8 trackers.
Data flow analysis. Figure 3 presents the flow of data between
sources and sinks. This is counted by the number of source-to-sink
paths found in each apps. The top sources of sensitive data are
Figure 2: Code analysis results.
Table 5: Trackers identified in contact tracing apps.
Trackers # Apps Percentage
Google Firebase 25 71.4%
Google CrashLytics 6 17.1%
Other Google trackers 4 11.4%
Facebook trackers 3 8.6%
Other trackers 9 25.7%
methods calling from Location and database.Cursor. These may
obtain sensitive information from a geographic location sensor or
from a database query. Most of the sensitive data will be transferred
to sinks, such as Bundle, Service, and OutputStream, which may
leak sensitive information out of apps. As discussed previously,
sending sensitive information to the Bundle object may reveal sen-
sitive data to other activities. Besides, developers usually utilize
Log to print debugging information into Logcat [4] panel. How-
ever, human errors from developers can lead to mistakenly print
sensitive data. Notably, we discover that some apps transmit loca-
tion information through SMS messages. Considering Hamagen
(Israel) as an example, location information is detected and obtained
by a source method initialize(Context,Location,e) and then
flows to a sink method where Handler.sendMessage(Message)
is called. This is a potential vulnerability as malware could easily
intercept the outbox of Android SMS service [15].
We also manually vet the FlowDroid results for false positives.
In total, 60 out of 371 paths (16.17%) are false positives (results
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Figure 3: Data flows detected between sources and sinks. Per-
centages indicate the fraction of flows originating at the
sources (left) and terminating at the sinks (right).
presented in Figure 3 are excluding these false positives). There
are mainly two categories of false positives. The first one is re-
lated to “Log” sinks where FlowDroid marks all log methods as
sinks, while some of them are not actually sensitive. For instance, in
TraceTogether, error messages, such as SQLiteException from the
stack trace that occurs while data querying, will be logged by Log.e
method. This matches the keywords and is false-positively identi-
fied as a sink. Another example is, in Private Kit, while the status
of LocationProvider changes, geo-location data are read in func-
tion LocationListener.onStatusChanged. According to the app
source code, we found only the status values, including OUT_OF_-
SERVICE, TEMPORARILY_UNAVAILABLE, and AVAILABLE, are logged
by Log.v or Log.d, instead of the logging of the geo-location data.
Most of the false positives we find fall into this category. Another
type of false positive results come from preference leakage detection.
For example, the app STOP COVID19 CAT (Spain) stores country
code (e.g. UK and AU) by invoking Locale.getCountry method
which is recognized as a source. As country code is not confiden-
tial and does not leak privacy, we consider this as a false-positive
source.
Malware detection. We discovered only one application, Stop
COVID-19 KG (Kyrgyzstan)2, containing malware. Two risks are
identified: a variant Of Android/DataCollector.Utilcode.A and
an Adware (0053e0591). Consider the limited spreads of this app
(about 10,000 downloads), we conclude that the vast majority of
contact tracing apps are free of malware.
3.3 Case Studies
From our curated list of 34 apps, we select four typical app to further
highlight key lessons we can learn with respect to security and
privacy risks. The case studies are based on TraceTogether, DP3T,
Private Kit, and COVIDSafe.
TraceTogether. According to the static analysis results, root detec-
tion [27] has been implemented, which potentially prevents SQL
injection and data breaches, thereby reducing the the risk to a cer-
tain extent. For example, in o/C3271ax.java, root detection logic
is implemented by detecting the existence of specific root files in
2https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=kg.cdt.stopcovid19
system, e.g. /system/app/Superuser.apk and /system/xbin/su;
by assessing their integrity, the application can detect whether a
device is rooted and subsequently block users from either login or
opening the applications.
However, TraceTogether also includes a third-party customer
feedback library, zendesk SDK, in which the remote WebView
debugging is enabled. This potentially allows attackers to dump the
content in the WebView [17]. When a user inputs confidential data,
including passwords and identity information, in a debug-enabled
WebView, attackers may be able to inspect all elements in the web
page by using remote debug tools [33]. Fortunately, according to
the static analysis, the onlyWebViewwith debugging mode enabled
is to display articles; therefore, does not contain confidential data.
Security guidance 1: Never leave WebView with debugging
mode enabled in the App release.
DP3T. According to the static analysis, DP3T’s database is not en-
crypted, and data is saved in plain text. In contrast to TraceTogether,
the app does not implement any root detection capabilities. This
means that a malicious app could possibly access the database di-
rectly and manipulate the database containing COVID-19 contact
records. Potentially, an adversary could spread false-positive.
Security guidance 2: To protect the database from being
dumped and prevent data breaches, a solution should:
(1) Implement database encryption [11] and
(2) Enable root detection [1] and confidential data protec-
tion [10] at application startup.
In addition, as the database records timestamps and contact
IDs, the leakage of the database from a root device infected by
a mobile system virus can be exploited to mount linkage attacks
by adversaries [9]. If enough data in a region were collected by
attackers, contact IDs and timestamps in the database can be used
to analyze movements by comparing data and device owners may
be identified through a linkage attack [60].
Private Kit. Similar to DP3T, Private Kit does not encrypt the data-
base and contains plaintext data. Besides, the app creates temporary
JSON files to store user’s location data. Without any encryption
and root detection, the temporary JSON files can be dumped from
root devices; thus increasing the risk of privacy leakage.
Security guidance 3: To prevent potential data breaches,
tracing records and confidential data must not be stored in
temporary files in plain text.
COVIDSafe. According to our experiments, COVIDSafe 1.0.11
stores all tracing histories, including contacted device IDs and times-
tamps, into SQLite database with plain text. Since the application
does not implement a root detection logic, tracing histories may
be leaked from root devices and potential Linkage Attacks can be
implemented [60]. However, in the latest version, COVIDSafe fixed
this issue by encrypting local database with a public key.
Mussared and McMurtry [32] discussed long-term device track-
ing and some other privacy-related attacks, substantiated as CVE-
2020-12856. In addition, due to the use of Generic Attribute Profile
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(GATT), the phone model name and the device name are shared
between users. Although this information may not be considered
as PII, it could be set by users in a form of “Firstname Lastname’s
Phone Moedl”, e.g. “Jim Green’s Pixel 2”, which allows an attacker
to easily re-identify and track a user as this information will be
continually broadcast. A practical demonstration of extracting such
information is available online.3 Furthermore, a bug is found when
a phone is locked; if its temporary ID is expired, the phone can-
not provide a new ID to devices in the proximity [45]. In such a
situation, a user will not be recorded by other users and will not
receive an at-risk alarm if someone she contacted with is diagnosed.
Considering that it is usual to keep a phone locked, this may lead
to serious false-negatives.
Security guidance 4: To protect the system against false-
negatives caused by malfunction, thorough and comprehen-
sive testings must be carried out. In particular, the situations,
such as the mobile phone is locked and app are running in
the background, should be seriously considered.
Besides aforementioned issues, in accordance with the report
released on 14 May 2020 [44], several vulnerabilities, such as CVE-
2020-12857 and CVE-2020-12858, have been fixed. In CVE-2020-
12857, the COVIDSafe app improperly catches GATT characteristic
values, i.e. TempID, for a long time until a successful transaction
takes place, instead of clearing the values periodically. As the data
could be read by a remote device, if an attacker never completes the
transaction, he will always obtain the same TempID from a user,
which may enable the long-term tracking of the user. However, this
issue has been fixed by removing the entry to catch when a device
is disconnected. The root cause of CVE-2020-12858 is because of the
generation and use of the unchanged advertising payload, which
means that an attacker is able to track a device by identifying its
advertising payload. In the latest update, the payload will not be
cached.
4 PRIVACY RISK ASSESSMENT
In this section, we describe the privacy analysis we conducted
on the 10 selected contact tracing solutions in Table 1 to assess
their protection against potential privacy breaches under our threat
model.
4.1 Threat Model
We consider four attackers in our threat model in addition to the
user groups defined in Section 2.1:
Application users. Those who install contact tracing applications
on their mobile phones will receive information about COVID-
19, e.g. an at-risk alarm. A regular user may reveal their private
information, e.g. name, gender, phone number, national ID, home
address, and location history, to the contact tracing systems, as well
as discover other users’ private information from the system—pubic
information or broadcasts from other users.
Health authorities. The actors are responsible for diagnosing
infections and collecting health information from Application users.
May learn or deduce private information about at-risk users. Health
3https://twitter.com/wabzqem/status/1257547477542027270
authorities will also help the diagnosed users record or upload
information to the contact tracing system.
Governments. These actors work with technology providers and
are often responsible for operating the contact tracing system. They
may access the data stored in a central server. In our threat model,
we suppose the Government (and even the cloud operator) is “un-
trusted”, that is, theymay use the collected data for purposes beyond
the pandemic.
Malicious adversaries. These adversaries have access to local
app information. They follow the defined algorithms, but wish
to learn more than the allowed information. They may have the
capability to access the local log of contact tracing applications, but
hacking the back-end server or another user’s device is out of the
scope of their capabilities. They may utilize some devices, such as
a Bluetooth broadcaster or receiver, to attack the system or gain
extra information. They may also modify the app and impersonate
a legitimate user to access the system, which is difficult to prevent
unless remote attestation is applied.
4.2 Potential Attacks
As discussed previously, the privacy of users is hard to preserve in
a contact tracing system. To introduce potential privacy risks, we
will let Alice be an at-risk user, and let Bob be a diagnosed user who
has been in contact with Alice.Mallory will be a malicious attacker,
and Grace will be the government server (or other authority). Here
we discuss four potential attacks. According to our threat model in
Section 4.1, if an attacker is not able to re-identify a user or inject
fake reports to a contact tracing system through a specific privacy
attack, we try to determine the system as well-protected to prevent
such an attack; otherwise, the system will be considered as at-risk.
The vetting results are summarized in Table 6.
Linkage attacks by servers. In centralized systems, the major
privacy concern is metadata leakage by the server. For example, in
Coronavirus Disease-19 website, TraceTogether and COVIDSafe,
a central server is used to collect PII information and to evaluate
at-risk individuals. Consequently, Grace will be able to collect a
large amount of PII, such as names, phone numbers, contact lists,
post code, home addresses, location trails. Therefore Grace is able
to deduce the social connections of Alice. Even for PEPP-PT, a
centralized Bluetooth system with solutions to avoid PII collection,
the re-identifiable risks still exist. For example, from the server side,
Grace is able to link ephemeral IDs to the corresponding permanent
app identifier and thus trace Alice based on IDs observed in the
past, as well as tracing future movements. Thus, no centralized
solutions in Table 1 can prevent linkage attacks by the server.
In contrast, for decentralized Bluetooth solutions, Alice’s privacy
is protected as her PII will not be sent to a central server by a
diagnosed user and her health status is evaluated on her own device.
Thus, decentralized Bluetooth systems are able to protect users’
privacy against linkage attacks by the server. However, in location-
based decentralized systems, e.g. Hamagen, the server learns users’
location trails.
Privacy guidance 1: To protect users’ privacy against link-
age attacks by a server, a contact tracing solution should:
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(1) Avoid sharing PII information with central points or
(2) Implement a decentralized design.
Linkage attacks by users. Linkage attacks, performed by Mallory,
try to re-identify Alice or Bob. As discussed previously, in contact
tracing systems that directly publish users’ PII, e.g. Coronavirus
Disease-19, Hamagen, and Health Code, Bob is at the risk of privacy
leakage. For example, in Coronavirus Disease-19, Mallory could
be able to re-identify Bob as he will know Bob’s gender, age, and
location history from public information.
The other 7 systems listed in Table 1 further rely on information
exchange between users. In number of the apps, e.g. DP3T, which
implement an ephemeral ID design, Mallory is still able to identify
Bob using more advanced attacks. For example, if Mallory places a
Bluetooth receiver near Bob’s home or working place and ensures
that the device will only receive Bluetooth broadcasts from Bob.
Once Bob is diagnosed, Mallory will receive an at-risk alarm and
immediately acknowledge that the infected patient is Bob. In addi-
tion, Mallory can log the timestamp and the received ephemeral
ID when in contact with Bob. Once Bob is diagnosed, Mallory is
able to trace back the source of recording and re-identify Bob and
potentially infected users. Similar attacks were described as Pa-
parazzi Attack and Nerd Attack in an analysis of DP3T [56]. Note
that Mallory is able to extend such attacks to Sybil attacks to enable
the identification and the tracing back of multiple targets at the
same time. Even worse, if Mallory distributes multiple broadcast
receivers, which could be also considered as a Sybil attack, in a
large area with some layout, e.g. honeycomb, they could even trace
the movement of Bob by tracing the records on each device. Thus,
none of the 10 typical solutions can fully protect users’ privacy
against linkage attacks by Mallory.
Privacy guidance 2: To protect users’ privacy against link-
age attacks by an adversary, a solution should:
(1) Avoid data sharing between users or
(2) Ensure privacy protections exist for any published data.
False positive claims. In some systems, such as Coronavirus Aus-
tralia, Bob can register as infected and upload data through the
contact tracing app to the server, which enables Alice to receive an
at-risk alarm. However, if Mallory exploits such a mechanism and
registers as a (fake) infected user, Alice will receive a false-positive
at-risk alarm, which may cause social panic or negatively impact
evidence-driven public health policies. Most solutions mitigate this
issue by implementing an authorization process, i.e. Bob is only
permitted to upload data after receiving a one-time-use permis-
sion code generated by the server. Without the permission code,
Mallory is not allowed to claim they are infected and Alice will
always receive a true at-risk alarm. Only two solutions, i.e. DP3T
and PACT [18], have no authorization process implemented.
Privacy guidance 3:To protect a system against false-positive-
claim attacks, a solution should establish an authorisation
process.
Table 6: Privacy protections against the attacks.
Solutions Linkage-Server Linkage-User False-Claim Relay
CovidSafe
Health Code
PEPP-PT
DP3T
HaMagen
TraceTogether
Coronavirus
Disease-19
Covid Watch
Private Kit
PACT
: the system is well protected : the system is at-risk
Relay attacks.4 To apply such an attack, Mallory could collect
existing broadcast messages exchanged between users, then replay
it at another time or forward it through proxy devices to a remote
location and replay the messages. Due to the lack of message vali-
dation in solutions that utilize information broadcasts, a user will
not be able to determine whether a received broadcast is from a
valid source or from a malicious device. Any received broadcast
will be recorded as a contact event, even though no actual contact
exists.
For example, suppose Mallory records the broadcasts from Bob
and then replays it hours later, or transmits it to a remote location
and replays the messages to Alice. Alice’s device, although not
actually being in contact with Bob, will receive and record the
replayed broadcast in its local log. Once Bob is diagnosed, Alice will
receive an at-risk alarm even though she has never been in contact
with Bob. Such an attack will falsely enlarge the contact range of
Bob and create a large amount of false-positive alarms, which may
cause panic among citizens. Solutions that do not utilize information
broadcasts, such as Coronavirus Disease-19 and Hamagen, can
avoid relay attacks.
In DP3T, a solution is provided to limit the replay attack by in-
cluding temporal information in the broadcast ephemeral identifiers.
However, it cannot effectively prevent replay attacks occurring at
the same moment. Another promising solution is to use an ambient
physical sensing approach, e.g. ambient audio. This has been shown
to secure proximity detection [26, 53] by comparing the ambient
information embedded in the broadcast messages with the local am-
bient. It allows a receiver to validate whether the source is nearby
as the range of Bluetooth broadcast is generally within 50 m.
Privacy guidance 4: To protect a system against relay at-
tacks, a solution should:
(1) Either avoid utilizing information broadcast or
(2) Implement a validation approach.
5 OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed in Section 4, a contact tracing application should
preserve the privacy of generic and at-risk users. Although the
diagnosed user may reveal their privacy to health authorities, we
should not release this data to the public. Furthermore, we argue
4The combination of man-in-the-middle and replay attacks are henceforth referred to
as a relay attack.
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that a contact tracing solution should focus on tracing anonymous
daily routines or occasional contacts, instead of close contacts.
Here we propose a venue-accessing-based solution, VenueTrace,
to overcome privacy risks. We will first describe the framework
of this solution and assess its privacy performance as well as its
limitations.
5.1 Our Privacy-by-Design: VenueTrace
The architecture of VenueTrace contact tracing consists of the fol-
lowing modules as described in Figure 4.
Bluetooth broadcaster in public places. Instead of broadcasting
from each user’s mobile phone, the VenueTrace proposes utilizing
Bluetooth broadcast devices installed in public places, e.g. restau-
rants, movie theaters, working places, and public transport hubs
and stops. This is in contrast to most existing Bluetooth solutions
that rely on human-to-human contact. To facilitate contact tracing,
at setup, each broadcast device will register its MAC address to a
back-end server and get a unique VenueID which will be broadcast
through Bluetooth at every Time Interval T . Hence, users are not
required to broadcast information.
Applications installed in the user’s phone. For every VenueID
broadcast by a device in its proximity at time t , after receiving the
broadcast VenueID, a pair (ID, t) will be created and a timer will be
started in the user application. If a user receives the VenueID after
T again, the user stores a tuple which satisfies the following:
(ID, tstar t , tend ), where tstar t − tend ≥ T , (1)
where tstar t is the first timestamp of the received the broadcast
VenueID in the local storage for 14 days; tend is the last timestamp
of a period over which a user continuously received VenueID. For
example, if T is set to 10 minutes and Bob stays in a public place
for more than 30 minutes, he will at least receive the broadcast for
three times, e.g. t1, t2, and t3. The application will record the tuple
(ID, t1, t3) in local log, where t3 - t1 = 20 minutes, indicating that
he stayed in a public place for at least 20 minutes.
Once Bob is diagnosed, with his consent, he will receive a per-
mission code from the health authority, then Bob can upload his
log (IDBob , tsBob , teBob ) and the permission code to the back-end
server. To ensure the security of data transmission, the data will be
encrypted with the Public Key of the back-end server. Every twenty-
four hours, Alice will download logs in a format of
(IDServer , tsServer , teServer ) from the back-end server and a record
match and an evaluation will be conducted locally. A local record,
i.e. (IDAlice , tsAlice , teAlice ), is considered as matched if the fol-
lowing conditions are true.
IDAlice = IDServer
(tsAlice , teAlice ) ⊆ (tsServer , teServer ), (2)
which indicates that Alice has been in a public place during the
period (tsServer , teServer ) and may have been in an at-risk envi-
ronment. If there is a match in Alice’s local log, Alice’s device will
generate an at-risk alarm.
Decentralized back-end server. The back-end server supports
the activities of (i) registering the Bluetooth broadcaster by storing
its MAC addresses and VenueIDs; (ii) generating and authorizing
permission codes to health authorities; (iii) publishing the public
key and deciphering the data uploaded by diagnosed users with its
private key; (iv) validating the received VenueIDs and permission
code; and (v) publishing at-risk information to regular users in the
format of tuples (IDServer , tsServer , teServer ),
IDServer = IDBob ,
tsServer = tsBob −T − random,
teServer = teBob + δt + random
′,
(3)
where the at-risk time interval is extended based on Bob’s record
byT in the upper limit and δt in the lower limit. A typical δt could
be set to 12 hours to ensure that Alice will be informed that she
has been in an at-risk venue where she may have touched a virus-
contaminated surface or inhaled airborne droplets, even though she
has never been in close physical contact with Bob.We could also fur-
ther extend the visiting duration with random noise to blur the time-
line. For example, if Bob visited a public place from 9 am to 10 am,
the released infected duration could be from 8:30 am to 11:15 pm,
where T = 5mins, random = 25mins,δt = 12 hours, random′ =
75mins . Considering the time-related functionality of a public place,
this duration could be further capped.
5.2 Defending Against Attacks
A major flaw in many implemented and proposed applications is
that they cannot fully guarantee user privacy when using user-
provided data. Of the applications discussed in this paper, this issue
is particularly prevalent with centralized solutions, e.g. TraceTo-
gether, as they may suffer from linkage attacks not only by users
but also by the server. However, any application that requires symp-
tom reporting from its user base could potentially be vulnerable, as
discussed in Section 4.
Decentralized computation. Compared to centralized systems,
our solution has the inherent advantage of decentralized systems,
that is, users’ privacy is not exposed to the server. The back-end
server will only receive the timestamp and VenueID of a public
place that is visited by diagnosed users. Supposing a malicious
attacker successfully extracts data from the back-end server, he is
still not able to link the information to any location or users as
there is no location information stored in the server. Thus, the user
privacy is protected against the linkage attack by a server.
Coarse-grained location. Furthermore, in contrast to location
based solutions (e.g. Hamagen) our solution does not utilize GPS
information as Bluetooth is more advantageous than GPS signals in
high risk indoor environments. However, considering the extension
and blurring in timelines, the back-end server will only receive and
publish venue IDs with at most coarse-grained location information.
In addition, our solution overcomes the limitation of location-based
tracing by installing the broadcaster in public venues and transports
in contrast to user devices.
No token exposure.Many Bluetooth-based decentralized systems
provide a privacy preserving solution by only sharing the tempo-
rary tokens between users. However, it is still amenable to linkage
attacks by users. Compared to other decentralized solutions, our
solution further preserves user privacy as no information is ex-
changed between users. Consequently, our system is immune to
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Figure 4: Overview of VenueTrace framework.
linkage attacks by users. In the worst case, the attackers may phys-
ically visit public places and record the venue IDs, then they may
link venue IDs to locations. After an at-risk alarm, the attacker may
perceive where a diagnosed user appeared. However, the attackers
still does not have enough information to re-identify the infected
individuals, unless they log all persons having appeared in multi-
ple public places for a long period and is able to infer the persons
matching the timeline. Thus, without information shared between
users, the linkage attack by users and real-time movement tracks
are impossible.
False positives. Aside from real people misreporting their symp-
toms, applications that rely on diagnosed users’ information are at
risk of malicious false-positive claim. For location-based applica-
tions, these attacks are very effective. For a GPS based system, an
attacker could spoof a series of GPS coordinates to an app. If no
authentication measures are implemented, uploading such spoofed
GPS data to the server can cause potential havoc across the system.
This scenario, in retrospect, emphasizes the design of permission
code in our recommendation. A user is allowed to register as in-
fected only after being authorized with a permission code, which
prevents false-positive claims.
Further considerations. To protect users’ privacy against relay at-
tacks, the VenueTrace solution can be updated by including blurred
location information in broadcasting. As a relay attack will replay a
VenueID in another remote place and thereby expanding the broad-
cast range and causing false-positive alarms, we can distinguish
fake broadcasts by combining the location of broadcasters in the
broadcast message. When the user receives a broadcast, the appli-
cation can parse out the location of the broadcaster and compare it
with the location of a receiver to filer those bounded by a distance,
e.g. greater than 1 km. This allows eliminating such replay forgeries.
As the original intention of the VenueTrace solution is to prevent
the back-end server from obtaining locations of broadcasters and
users, we can only add vague location information to the broadcast
information, such as adding a 1 km error, to prevent the relay attack
while preserving users’ privacy. However, this, to some extent,
weakens the location privacy protections of our solutions.
6 RELATEDWORK
Location tracking. Recent works have explored extracting loca-
tion information from mobile apps [48, 51, 57, 59]. For instance,
Xue et al. [58] presented a supervised machine learning methodol-
ogy to localize users without any reverse engineering of the app.
In our vetting, we considered such situation as a linkage attack
by users, which extended the scope to also include tracking via
Bluetooth. Although it may cost much to build up a large-scale
Bluetooth broadcasting and receiving network, e.g. a honeycomb
layout, to apply a movement tracking attack, it is still a considerable
risk of privacy leakage.
Contact tracing tools analysis. Several recent works have fo-
cused on the evaluation and analysis of contact tracing applications.
Just 10 days after TraceTogether launched, Cho et al. [20] presented
a constructive discussion of potential modifications to encourage
community efforts to develop solutions with stronger privacy pro-
tection and argued that privacy is a central feature of mobile contact
tracing apps. One week later, Vaudenay [56] analyzed the DP3T
solution and pointed out that some privacy protection measure-
ments by DP3T may have the opposite effect. Gvili [25] presented a
security analysis of the Bluetooth and cryptography specifications
published by Apple and Google [29, 30], arguing that significant
risks may be introduced by this solution. Other works [38, 40] con-
ducted a review of the centralized and decentralized solutions and
proposed contact tracing using a zero-knowledge protocol.
Our work. In contrast to aforementioned works, our research not
only focuses on the analysis of one solution or the comparison
between centralized and decentralized designs, but also conducts
a security and privacy vetting on multiple state-of-the-practice
approaches. Concretely, we aim to extract security and privacy
guidance from various solutions and propose more practical pro-
tection of individual security and privacy.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has conducted a security analysis of 34 contact tracing
applications and evaluated the privacy performance of 10 solutions.
The results show that security risks remain; such as using dep-
recated cryptographic algorithms, storing sensitive information
in clear text, and allowing permissions for backup. Thus, we rec-
ommend that the reported vulnerabilities be patched as soon as
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possible, although we appreciate that developers may prioritize the
speed of product release to counter the pandemic. That said, the
majority of patches are straightforward. For example, over 70% of
developers still use insecure hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5,
or storing sensitive information in clear text. Further, to ensure se-
curity and remove potential vulnerabilities, code should be released
for public review.
Our analysis has shown that protecting privacy is more challeng-
ing, particularly as this must be balanced against the urgency of
the pandemic. To the best of our knowledge, there are no solutions
that can protect users’ privacy against all potential attacks. Besides
the solutions that collect private information, the results of our
privacy vetting indicates that most of the contact tracing apps are
potentially vulnerable to malicious privacy attacks. We limit our
scope to software vulnerabilities and privacy leakage. Examining
Bluetooth Low Energy and network traffic originating from contact
tracing apps are worth further exploration.
To overcome a number of these issues, we have proposed a
privacy-preserving contact tracing design, termed VenueTrace. The
proposed recommendation has a decentralized architecture inwhich
no information is exchanged among users and no location and iden-
tifiable information will be exposed to the server. However, just as
with other apps, it is impossible to address all potential risks, e.g.
our solution is similarly vulnerable to the relay attack; a solution
requires compromising the privacy of our approach. We hope our
study can inform and aid the software industry to design, develop,
and deploy more secure (and privacy-preserving) contact tracing
apps whilst allowing citizens to use contact tracing apps with more
confidence in the capability of the apps to protect their security
and privacy.
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APPENDICES
A STATIC ANALYSIS
Code analysis.MobSF is a state-of-the-art and open source pen-
testing, malware analysis and security vetting framework [16],
which flags vulnerabilities in code.
For context,MobSFworks in the following way. The de-compiled
AndroidManifest.xml file is first parsed to extract essential infor-
mation about the application, such as Permission, Components,
Intents. Then, the system assess requested permissions by the
application and examine whether all Components (e.g. Service,
Receiver, Activity, Provider) are protected by at least one per-
mission explicitly requested in manifest file. Other attribute config-
urations, such as the allowBackup, debuggable, and networkSe-
curityConfig flags, will also be checked.
The class files are subsequently parsed via a Sensitive Data
Match module, which utilizes keyword matching, e.g. “password”
and “secret”. The Method Extraction module matches methods in
class files with pre-defined rules to extract vulnerable methods.
For example, if a method contains the keyword .hashCode(), it
will be considered as using Java Hash Code, a weak hash function
that should not be used in a secure cryptography implementation.
However, as a weakness could be defined in third-party APIs, the
vulnerable method may never be executed during run-time. To
address this, the Determining vulnerable Calls module will vet
whether a vulnerable method is actually called and assess whether
the sensitive data is accessed. The system will record all the vul-
nerabilities listed in the Manifest Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities
categories in Table 4. Further, the trackers in apps, e.g. Google
Firebase Analytics, Facebook Analytics, and Microsoft Ap-
pcenter Analytics are detected by the Tracker Detection module
and will be recorded in the Privacy Leaks category in Table 4.
The vetted vulnerabilities include SQL injection, IP address dis-
closure, hard-coded encryption keys, improper encryption, use of
insufficiently random values (CWE 330) [3], insecure hash func-
tions, and remote WebView debugging is enabled. We detail the
manual inspections adopted subsequently in the vetting process in
Appendix B and limitations to the code analysis vetting methods
in Appendix D.
Data flow analysis. We conduct a data flow analysis using Flow-
Droid [15] to screen out high risk privacy leaks. Such data flow
analysis extracts the paths from data sources to sinks, and the
statements transmitting the data outside of the application. We use
the sources and sinks inferred by SuSi project [50] which defines
sources as calls to resource methods, e.g. getLatitude() and data-
base.Cursor.getString(), while sinks aremethods thatmay leak
sources, e.g. Log.e() and Bundle.putAll().
FlowDroid searches the application for lifecycle and callback
methods and then generates a call graph. Starting at the detected
sources, the analysis tracks taints by traversing the call graph. If
private data flows from a source to sink, it indicates that there is
a risky privacy leak path. To remove false-positives, we conduct
a backward flow analysis. If the vulnerable code is reachable, we
determine it is a valid privacy leak. For example, if we find there is
sensitive data that flows into a sink (e.g. Bundle, Log output, SMS)
unauthorized users can access, we will trace it backwards to its
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source and confirmwhether the source is reachable. If reachable, we
consider it as a privacy leakage. Similar to the code analysis phase,
we also conduct a manual inspection described in Appendix C. We
describe the limitations to the vetting method in Appendix D.
B CODE ANALYSIS: MANUAL INSPECTIONS
To increase the accuracy of the vetting results, we manually verified
the testing results of MobSF. First, considering that MobSF mainly
relies on keywords and sentences matching in APIs, we check the
rules defined inMobSF’s source code. Then, we collect rules with
weak keywords defined. For example, if a rule only uses Log.v or
System.out.print to find “sensitive data logging”, without check-
ing whether the data is sensitive, we consider this is a weak rule.
We automated the extraction of all Java files which are identified
by these weak rules for manual inspection. Finally, we removed the
false-positive cases from the testing results.
C DATA FLOW ANALYSIS: MANUAL
INSPECTIONS
For data flow taint analysis, we manually review the FlowDroid
results of all 34 apps. Since all APK files have been decompiled by
MobSF, sink paths in XML reports generated by FlowDroid are
closely contrasted with decompiled source codes in order to identify
false-positive cases. First, sink paths are picked out to analyze the
possibility of potential leakage. If any of these paths are suspected
to be false-positive cases, we load source codes decompiled by
MobSF in Visual Studio Code [13] and use its global search feature
to find invoked methods mentioned in suspected sink paths. Finally,
after analyzing the logic from source code, false-positive cases are
confirmed.
D THREATS TO VALIDITY
Potential limitations to our methodology. Considering that
both the core mechanisms of MobSF and FlowDroid heavily rely
on keywords matching, a potential cause of false negatives is largely
due to the scope of keywords. Concretely, in MobSF, there may
exist vulnerabilities not defined in analysis rules. Similarly, in our
data flow vetting, as we utilize the sources and sinks extracted by
SuSi project, there may exist sensitive leakage that does not match
any sources or sinks or that is not detected. We aim to improve
the false negative by updating the rules and keywords database of
MobSF and FlowDroid in future avenue. Currently, our vetting
focuses more on the identified vulnerabilities and privacy leakage
paths.
